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J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,

114 S. CT. 1419 (1994).

INTRODUCTION

On October 21, 1991, jury selection began in the civil paternity
action against J.E.B.' The State of Alabama had filed a complaint for
paternity and child support on behalf of T.B., alleging that J.E.B. was the
father of T.B.'s minor child. 2 The Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Alabama assembled a panel of thirty-six potential jurors, twelve males
and twenty-four females. 3 The court struck two men and one woman for
cause, leaving only ten male jurors out of the remaining total of thirtythree. 4 The State's attorney then used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to
remove male jurors.5 J.E.B.'s attorney used his first ten strikes to eliminate women from the jury, and exercised his eleventh strike to eliminate
the last remaining male.6 As a result, the petit jury consisted exclusively
of females. 7
Before the jury was empaneled, J.E.B's attorney challenged the
State's peremptory strikes.' He argued, using Batson v. Kentucky9 and its
progeny," that these strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

1. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
2. Id. This complaint was filed in the District Court of Jackson County. After a hearing the
District Court entered an order adjudicating paternity and ordered the father to pay child support.
Then, the father appealed to the Circuit Court. J.E.B. v. State of Alabama ex reI. T.B., 606 So. 2d
156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
3. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
4. Id. at 1421-22.
5. Id. at 1422.
6. Brief for Respondent at 2, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (No.
92-1239) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
7. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
8. Brief for Petitioner at 3, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (No. 921239) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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Fourteenth Amendment because they were exercised against male jurors
solely on the basis of gender." The trial judge rejected these arguments
and empaneled the all-female jury, based on the holding that Batson does
not apply to gender discrimination.' 2
The jury found that J.E.B. was the father of T.B.'s child and the
court entered an order directing J.E.B. to pay child support.'3 J.E.B. filed
a post-judgment motion requesting a JNOV, or, in the alternative, a trial
de novo.'4 J.E.B. again argued that under the Batson rationale Alabama's
peremptory strikes based on gender violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
The circuit court rejected the motion, and repeated its ruling that Batson
does not extend to gender-based peremptory challenges.6
On appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, 7 based on
Alabama precedent.' The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' and
reversed, holding that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality."21
This casenote will examine the shortcomings of the J.E.B. opinion,
predictions regarding the Court's future attitude on peremptory
challenges,' the practical implications of this decision on trial practice,
11. J.E.B.'s counsel additionally argued that, since approximately 75% of the venire consisted
of women, and "virtually" none of the stricken jurors answered any questions which would show any
prejudice, the inference of gender-based peremptory challenges was even stronger. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 3-4. The trial judge simply rejected these arguments on the following grounds:
race was not the issue; voir dire started with 62 potential jurors but the judge thought he did not need
all 62 so he instructed his clerk to take every other name until they arrived at the 36 jurors. According to the judge, "[tihat's the way these people wound up where they [were]." Id. at 4.
12. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
13. Id.
14. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4.
15. rd.
16. Id.at 5.
17. J.E.B. v. State, 606 So. 2d at 157.
18. See, e.g., Exparte Murphy, 596 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1992).
19. J.E.B. v. State of Alabama ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156 (cert. denied by the Alabama
Supreme Court on October 23, 1992, No. 1911717).
20. JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
21. J.E.B., 114S. Ct. at 1421.
22. The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is exercised without a reason
stated, without inquiry, and without being subject to the court's control. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 220 (1965). Each litigant is allowed to use a limited number of peremptory strikes, which can be
used to remove jurors who the litigant believes is somehow favorable to the other side. JON M. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS

145 (1977).
In the trial of civil cases in the Wyoming district courts, each side is allowed three peremptory challenges. WyO. STAT. § 1-11-202 (1977). WyO. R. CIV. P. 47(e) (Supp. 1995) also allows
three peremptory strikes on each side.
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and what litigants need to be aware of before commencing the voir dire
process. The casenote finds that J.E.B. was correctly decided as a constitutional matter but criticizes the majority's reasoning as unpersuasive. The
casenote concludes that adherence to the Batson/J.E.B. line of cases is
undesirable.
BACKGROUND

United States Supreme Court
Race-based Peremptory Challenges
The development of Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment regarding discrimination in jury selection began in a criminal
context with Strauder v. West Virginia.' Although the Supreme Court did
not clearly base its decision on the equal protection rights either of black
criminal defendants or of the prospective jurors, the Court recognized that
the exclusion of prospective jurors because of their race is "an assertion
of their inferiority."'24 Although Strauder recognized the right for black
males to be called for jury service, it did nothing to prevent their peremptory dismissal solely because of their race. 25
26
Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama
extended Strauder to peremptory challenges. However, the Court limited
the scope of the protection against race-based dismissal by requiring a
claimant to show systematic racial discrimination in jury selection over a
period of time. 27 The Court stated that when a prosecutor, case after case,
In the trial of criminal cases, WYo. R. CRIM. P. 24(d) (Supp. 1995) contains the following
provisions:
24(d)(1) Felony cases punishable by death: each defendant gets twelve peremptories;
felony punishable by more than one year: eight peremptories.
24(d)(2) Misdemeanor cases punishable by one year or less: the defendant gets four
peremptories; juvenile delinquency cases: each juvenile gets four peremptories.
The prosecution gets the same number of peremptories as the total number allowed to
all defendants.
23. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (struck down a state statute that restricted jury service to white men
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
24. Id. at 308.
25. See Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Questfor Reasoned
Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 955 (1994).
26. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
27. Id. at 227. The Court adhered to this high "systematic discrimination" standard, reasoning
that if the barrier would be lowered, "[t]he challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory."
Id. at 222 (emphasis in original). The Court held that the presumption in every case must be that the
prosecutor's peremptories are based on fair, nondiscriminatory reasons. Id.
The evidentiay standard established in Swain was heavily criticized for its insurmountability.
See George B. Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Strike Blacks From
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is responsible for the removal of qualified black jurors, with the result
that no blacks ever serve on petit juries, "the Fourteenth Amendment
claim takes on added significance.""
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky 9 overruled

Swain's requirement of a showing of systematic discrimination in more
than just the case at hand. 30 The Court held that establishing purposeful
discrimination in the case at bar is sufficient to invalidate the particular
challenges at issue.31 A defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in
whole or in part of his own race but does have the right to be tried by a
jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.32
Subsequently, in Powers v. Ohio,33 Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.,34 and Georgia v McCollum,3" the Court recognized that race-based
peremptories also violate the equal protection rights of the excluded jurors
and significantly extended the reach of Batson. The court held that white
persons have standing to challenge discriminatory strikes of blacks,36 and
that Batson applies to civil as well as criminal cases,37 and to strikes by

private parties as well as the state.3"

Juries, 27 How. L.J. 1571, 1576-77 (1984). Smith rightfully argued that the standard is difficult to
apply because most jurisdictions do not keep track of the exact times, frequency and circumstances of
the prosecutors' strikes. Id. See also Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a
Manipulative Device in CriminalTrials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192, 196235 (1978).
28. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
29. 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
30. In Batson, a prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove the only four blacks
from the venire in a routine criminal case. Id. at 82-83. The all-white jury convicted the black defendant on charges of second degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. Id. at 83. However, the
Batson Court reversed. Id. at 100.
31. Id. at 89. The Court expressly declined to give its view on the applicability of the Equal
Protection doctrine to peremptory challenges by defense counsel. Id.at 89 n. 12. The Supreme Court
later addressed this issue in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), and held that Batson does
apply to defense peremptories. See infra note 35.
32. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85.
33. 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (removed Batson requirement that excluded juror be of same race as
the complaining criminal defendant).
34. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (stretched Equal Protection Clause to find state action in race-based
peremptory strikes by private party in civil litigation).
35. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (went even further and extended the Batson doctrine to race-based
peremptory challenges by criminal defendants).
36. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
37. Edmondson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088.
38. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
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Gender-based Peremptory Challenges
The gender issue as to peremptory challenges did not present itself
until long after Strauder because juries typically consisted exclusively of
men39 until the last decades.' In Ballard v. United States,4 the Court for
the first time exercised its supervisory authority over the administration of
justice in the federal courts to reverse an exclusion of women from jury
service.42 The Court held that a federal court errs when it systematically
excludes women from service in a federal jury panel in a state where
women are eligible for jury service under state law.43 In 1975, the Court
in Taylor v. Louisiana' struck down a Louisiana statute which excluded
women from jury service unless they had previously filed a written declaration of willingness to serve. 5 The Court found that women are an
identifiable group sufficiently numerous and distinct from men and that
their systematic elimination from juries violates the Sixth Amendment.'

39. The prohibition of women on juries was derived from the English common law, which
excluded women from juries under the doctrine of propterdefectum sexus (=the defect of sex). 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362.
Not only is the defect of sex doctrine done away with in England; the Parliament abolished
the whole institution of peremptory challenges in 1988. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND
ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 223 (1994).

40. As late as 1965, in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, the Court addressed the equal protection principles as to the exclusion of potential jury members in terms of "[j]urymen," Id. at 204
(emphasis added) (citations omitted), and "veniremen," Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
41. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
42. Id. at 193.
43. Id. The court noted: "[A] flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The
exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the community than would be true if
an economic or racial group were excluded." Id. at 194.
44. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
45. Id. at 525. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the Court upheld a Florida statute
which automatically exempted women from jury service unless they voluntarily registered, reasoning
that "[diespite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone
years ... woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." Id. at 61-62.
In 1961, women were still not eligible for jury service in three states: Alabama, Mississippi,
and South Carolina. Id. at 62 n.5.
46. Taylor, 419 U.S. 531. The Court reaffirmed Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
holding that the Sixth Amendment provision for an impartial jury is binding on the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526. Thus, the Court's ruling was based on the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury trial in criminal prosecutions, rather than on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 525. Because of this distinction, the Court did not
overrule Hoyt. See supra note 45.
However, the Court also held that while Sixth Amendment applied to the drawing of jurors
from a community, it did not apply to the formation of the jury panel itself. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 53337. Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its belief that the Sixth Amendment is not aimed at the
exercise of peremptory challenges by either party. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990).
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Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
In U.S. v. Brown,' the Tenth Circuit reasoned that although Batson
proscribed the exercise of peremptory strikes for purely racial reasons, it
did not forbid challenges of prospective jurors for legitimate reasons "tangentially connected with their race." 48 In Brown, the court held that the
prosecution's strikes of two black jurors violated Batson. 9 The prosecution declared they were afraid, based on past experience with the black
opposing counsel, that black jurors would be influenced to acquit the
defendant because of the mere presence of this counsel."0 Since the
prosecution's concern was based on surmise rather than fact, the court
found this "precisely the kind of presumption that will not withstand [the
Batson test].""
Shortly before J.E.B. was decided, the Tenth Circuit again addressed the extent of the Batson doctrine in U.S. v. Johnson." The defendant claimed that the prosecution violated Batson by striking two black
venirepersons 3 The prosecution stated that they expected the first juror
to be unable to pay attention to the evidence because this juror was inattentive during voir dire.54 The second juror, a schoolteacher, was struck
because the prosecution believed, based on its past experience, that teachers did not make good jurors. 5 The Tenth Circuit held that these explanations were facially race neutral, because they were based on some reason
other than race. 6 The justifications were also not pretextual since the
prosecution did not use its opportunity to strike a third black woman57
who served as the jury foreperson 8
47.

817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987).

48.

Id. at 676.

49.

Id.

50. Id. at 675.
the voir dire had disclosed an affinity between a
51. Id. at 676. The court indicated "[ilf
potential juror and defense counsel, even if that affinity is linked to race, it is logical to presume
defense counsel would have an advantage with that juror." Id. (emphasis added). In such a situation,
the use of a peremptory strike against that juror would be justifiable.
52. 4 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1993).

Id.

53. Id. at 912.
54. Id. at 913.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 913-14.

57. Id. at 913. The court had already held in United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461 (10th
Cir. 1991), that the presence of members of the subject race on the petit jury is a relevant factor in
negating an alleged Batson violation when the state had the opportunity to strike the juror. Id. at
1468.

58. Johnson, 4 F.3d at 913. The court noted, in dictum, that the removal of this last black
juror would have established a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 914. The court based this
conclusion on United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987). In Chalan, an American-
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Wyoming Supreme Court
In the criminal context, the Wyoming Supreme Court has dealt with
the issue of the Equal Protection doctrine as it applies to peremptory
challenges on several occasions." The court focused in these decisions on
the rights of the criminal defendants.
The court gave its most illustrative interpretation of Batson in
Bueno-Hernandez v. State." The prosecution in this case used three of its
peremptory challenges to strike venire members who were apparently of
Mexican-American heritage. 6 The prosecution declared they struck the
first juror because she was known to the prosecution's office and after
discussing her "in great length," they decided she would not be a good
juror." As to the second juror, the prosecution claimed that because its
office sued this juror for collection, the person might have a bias against
them. Finally, the prosecution merely stated that the third juror was
known to the office to be "anti-law enforcement."' The court concluded
that even if the three stricken venire members were of Hispanic ethnicity,
the prosecution offered a sufficiently race-neutral explanation for striking
them.' As other appellate courts, the Wyoming Supreme Court accords
great deference to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the
striking attorney's declarations.'

Indian defendant was, among other things, convicted of first-degree murder and robbery. Id. at 1304.
There were three, or possibly four American-Indians on the venire. Three of them were removed for
cause and the prosecutor peremptorily struck the last one. Id. at 1313-14. According to the court, the
striking of this last American-Indian established a primafacie case of intentional discrimination under
Batson. Id.at 1314.
59. In Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1984) (Engberg 1), the court noted it could
not see people who have inhibitions about the death penalty as a distinctive group requiring
specific representation on the jury panel. Id. at 550. Such groups had to be "objectively identifiable." Id. The groups which fit these criteria "almost universally" had been racial, ethnic or
sexual in nature. Id. See also Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1003 (Wyo. 1984); Jennings v,
State, 806 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1991). The Wyoming Supreme Court has not yet addressed cases
concerning the use of gender-based strikes.
60. 724 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1986).
61. Id. at 1133. During voir dire, no questions were asked to establish the race of the excluded
veniremembers. Thus, there was no indication in the record that the three stricken jurors were of
actual Hispanic ethnicity, other than their Spanish surnames. Id. at 1134.
62. Id. at 1135. The prosecution did not explain how, or on what basis, they came to that
conclusion.
63. Id.
64. Id. Again, the prosecution did not give any explanation as to how they knew this.
65. Id.
66. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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PRINCIPAL CASE

Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion in J.E.B. ,67 started by reaffirming "what [at that point in time] should be axiomatic:""5 the
Equal Protection Clause does not allow intentional gender discrimination
by state actors.69 Applying the heightened scrutiny standard,7'

Justice

Blackmun concluded that the state offered virtually no support for the
conclusion that gender alone is an accurate predictor of jurors' attitudes.7
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stressed that the right of individual jurors
to have a nondiscriminatory jury selection procedure applied to both men
and women.' According to Justice Blackmun, the Court's majority ruling
did not abhor the institution of peremptory strikes nor did it interfere with

a state's interest in using such challenges in an effort to secure a fair and
impartial trial.73 He noted that a proper conduct of the voir dire procedure

can lead to a firm basis for intelligent use of peremptory challenges.

4

In her concurrence,75 Justice O'Connor emphasized her conviction
that the majority's holding should be limited to the government's use of
gender-based peremptory strikes.76 Justice O'Connor strongly preferred a
limited view of the term "state actor" because she was concerned that the
majority's decision would further erode the role of peremptory challenges

67. In his opinion, Justice Blackmun almost exclusively focused on the past exclusion of women from the jury and voting process, J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422-25. Therefore, one might forget
J.E.B. came up because the state used all but one of its peremptories to strike males from the petit
jury. d. at 1422.
68. Id. at 1422.
69. Id. This is especially true "where, as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women." Id.
70. Justice Blackmun formulated this standard as "whether peremptory challenges based on
gender stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury." Id.
at 1426. He stated this approach was warranted because of the "long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination [in this country]." Id. at 1425.
71. Id at 1427. Justice Blackmun reasoned the state's rationale for its strikes "is reminiscent of
the arguments advanced to justify the total exclusion of women from juries." Id. at 1426.
72. Id. at 1428. Justice Blackmun added: "It denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror and,
for a woman, reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participation." Id.
73. Id. at 1429.
74. Id. In addition, Justice Blackmun made a practical argument, stating that many jurisdictions
who extended Batson to gender before J.E.B. were capable of adhering to the rule proscribing gender-based peremptory strikes. Id. at 1429 (referring to 1422 n., which lists the jurisdictions who
extended or refused to extend Batson to gender).
In conclusion, Justice Blackmun observed that because gender and race are overlapping
categories, the danger that gender-based peremptory strikes will be used as a pretext for racial discrimination is present if such strikes are allowed. d. at 1430. If this would be allowed, the core
guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause would become meaningless. Id.
75. Id. at 1430 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 1431.
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and further proliferate mini-hearings and appeals on discriminatory use of
peremptory strikes.' In addition, if carried to its full extent, this development would force lawyers to attempt to articulate instinctive, often
inarticulable reasons for their use of peremptories.78 Moreover, it would
increase the possibility that biased jurors would be allowed on the jury.79
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion to explain his more
textual and traditional understanding as to the basis of the majority's
holding.' According to Justice Kennedy, the Equal Protection Clause and
the constitutional tradition in this country are based on the belief that an
individual possesses rights which are protected against unlawful governmental actions." In this regard, Justice Kennedy thought it important to
note that a juror sits as an individual citizen, not as a representative of a
racial or sexual group.' In Justice Kennedy's view, the only logical
Clause prohibits discriminainference could be that the Equal Protection
83
tion on the basis of race or gender.
In his dissenting opinion,' Chief Justice Rehnquist contended
even if Batson was correctly decided," race and gender discrimination
are such different phenomena that the Batson principle should not be
extended to peremptory challenges based on gender. 6 First, the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence revealed different levels of
scrutiny for race (strict) and gender (heightened).' In addition, Justice

77. Id. This discussion regarding the meaning of the term "state actor" goes back to
Edmondson and McCollum. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor, who
wrote dissents to both of those opinions, argued that the Edmondson court made "the mistake" of
including private civil litigants as state actors when they exercise peremptory challenges. J.E.B., 114
S.Ct. at 1432. Subsequently, in her view, the McCollum court "compounded the mistake" by stretching the meaning of "state actor" to criminal defendants. Id.
78. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431.
79. Id. at 1431-32. According to Justice O'Connor, the J.E.B. opinion increased this possibility because "sometimes a lawyer will be unable to provide an acceptable gender-neutral explanation
even though the lawyer is in fact correct that the juror is unsympathetic. ' Id. at 1431.
80. Id. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 1433-34.
82. Id. at 1434.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1434 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his dissent to J.E.B., Justice Rehnquist assumed, arguendo,
that Batson was correctly decided. However, he also joined Justice Scalia's dissent, which indicated a
desire to overrule Batson. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1434.
86. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1434-35. According to Justice Rehnquist, Batson, in its core meaning, was meant to apply solely to "the uniquely sensitive area of race." Id. at 1435 (quoting Brown
v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 942 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
87. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1435. Justice Rehnquist qualified the heightened scrutiny standard as
a "less searching standard of review." Id.
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Rehnquist argued that the two sexes differ, both biologically, and, to a
decreasing extent, in experience.88
Justice Scalia wrote a fuming dissent89 in which he said that the
Court's reasoning was "largely obscured by anti-male-chauvinist oratory"9° which was "utterly irrelevant""' to the case at hand. He stated the
Court's "unisex approach" seemed to put it at odds with Taylor 92 and its
progeny." Moreover, Justice Scalia intimated that the Court's reasoning
was disingenuous because if the Court really thought gender played no
identifiable role in juror's attitudes, the error in this case would have been
harmless.' Justice Scalia further thought the majority's opinion focused
unrealistically upon individual exercises of peremptory challenges, and
ignored the totality of the practice." Finally, he argued that voir dire cannot fill the gap left by the restrictions on peremptory strikes, even if the
voir dire process expands. 96
ANALYSIS

Viewing the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence on

peremptory challenges from Batson to J.E.B., two images emerge. First,
any race- or gender-based peremptory strike by any party will presumably
constitute state action for equal protection purposes.' Second, the Constitutional principle that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause may
occur when the government discriminates against a suspect class98 or

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id.at 1438.
91. Id.at 1436.
92. 419 U.S. at 532 n.12 ("women bring to juries their own perspectives and values that influence both jury deliberation and result."). But, according to Justice Scalia, times and trends change,
"and unisex is unquestionably in fashion." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436.
93. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1436.
94. Id.at 1437. Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in effect answered this argument by stressing the injury the juror suffers when stricken because of his or her gender. Id. at 1434. In this context, Justice O'Connor warned that the Court should not weigh the criminal defendant's interest too
lightly. Id. at 1432-33. According to Justice O'Connor, limiting the accused's use of the peremptory
is "a serious misordering of ... priorities." This limitation means the Court considers the right of
citizens to perform jury service to override the rights of the criminal defendant, "even though it is the
defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death." Id.(quoting Justice Thomas in
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
95. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1437.
96. /d. at 1438-39. Justice Scalia concluded that the majority's reasoning placed all peremptory
strikes based on any group characteristic at risk, since they all can be denominated "stereotypes." Id.
at 1438.
97. See generally United States v. Annigoni, 57 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1995).
98. A "suspect class" is a class of individuals who have historically suffered discrimination.
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when the government interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
also applies to the exercise of peremptory strikes.
Requirements to Establish J.E.B. Violation
As with race-based Batson claims, the party bringing the J.E.B.
motion must establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination. The
party first must show that the opposing party used peremptory strikes to
remove individuals of a cognizable group from the venire. Secondly, the
party must show that these strikes, together with other relevant
circumstances, 91 raise an inference that the striking party challenged the
venireperson on account of gender.'I°
In short, courts require a showing of a pattern of discrimination'°I in
order to establish a primafacie case of gender discrimination." Statistics
may strengthen or weaken a prima facie case but are not by themselves
dispositive. 0 3 There is no magic number as to the minimal amount of
strikes required in order to establish a prima facie case under either
Batson or J.E.B. "o4 Presumably, it is more difficult to establish a prima
facie case based on gender than on race when the venire contains few

For an introduction to the term "suspect class," see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944).
99. These relevant circumstances include: a pattern of strikes against members of a partieular
sex; a disproportionate use of peremptory strikes against members of that sex; the level of representation of that sex in the venire as compared to the jury; the moving party's questions and statements
during voir dire and while exercising peremptory challenges; whether the excluded persons is a heterogeneous group, sharing their gender as only common characteristic; the gender of the defendant,
victim and witnesses. People v. Figgs, 654 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Ill. App. 1995).
100. United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
101. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. A pattern implies that the striking party
chose this action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted).
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Chapman, 454 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1995), went
as far as, in effect, dispensing with the primafacie case-requirement and shifting the burden immediately to the striking party to come up with a race or gender neutral reason. The Court reasoned that
"requesting a Batson hearing in effect sets out a primafacie case of discrimination ... the striking of
any juror can raise the inference of race- and/or gender-based discrimination." Id. at 320. It is unclear whether more courts will take this drastic step.
102. See, e.g., People v. Blackwell, 646 N.E.2d 610, 614 (I11.1995); Nelson v. U.S., 649
A.2d 301, 310-11 (D.C. 1994); cf. Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1210 (D.C. 1993).
103. See Jackson v. State, No. CR-93-391, 1995 WL 127112, at *2 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 24,
1995): Folsom v. State, No. CR-93-1835, 1995 WL 217580, at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 14, 1995).
104. See Hemphill v. State, No. CR-93-2136, 1995 WL 490600, at *4 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug.
18, 1995) (use of six of twelve peremptory strikes to remove members of one particular sex without
more not sufficient to establish prima facie case); Mors v. Dothan, 659 So. 2d 979, 980 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1995) (use of eight of nine peremptory strikes to remove men from the jury, leaving one or two
males on the jury, may be enough).
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racial minorities. 5 In some Batson situations, a prima facie case can be
established when one juror is stricken, or it is at least a strong indication
of discrimination.16 It is unlikely that a venire will consist of only one
member of either sex, even after the strikes for cause.
Once the moving party establishes a prima facie case of gender
discrimination, the burden shifts to the opposing party to give a facially
valid gender-neutral reason for the strikes."' 7 In Hernandez v. New
York,"~ the Supreme Court held that unless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the opposing party's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral. 109 In Purkett v. Elem," the Court indicated that this
facial validity requirement does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible."'
If such a facially neutral reason is tendered, the movant then ultimately has to prove the peremptory strike was a pretext for discrimination." 2 At this stage, the plausibility and persuasiveness of the justifica-

105. In order for the peremptory challenges to retain any meaning, courts will have to
impose much higher standards to find a prima facie case in the gender setting than they have
done in the race context.
106. See, e.g., Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1313-14; In re Paternity of Codey M.R., 522 N.W.2d 222,
225 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (race- or gender-based elimination of even one juror violates the Equal
Protection Clause but the fact of that elimination, without more, does not establish a primafacie case
that the juror was struck pursuant to a discriminatory purpose).
107. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
108. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
109. Id. For circumstances in which there can be (in)sufficient rebuttal, see State v.
Starks, 533 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (litigant may not justify peremptory challenges to venire members of one gender unless venire members of other gender with comparable
or similar characteristics are also challenged); cf. Davidson v. Harris, 30 F.3d 963 (8th Cir.
1994); Allen v. State, 659 So. 2d 151, 152 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (purely speculative and
remote reasoning is inadequate to rebut the presumption of gender-based discrimination); Koo
v. State, 640 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant's explanation that he struck juror
because she was young and attractive and he sensed electricity between her and male prosecutor
not gender neutral, even when mixed with neutral reasons); see also People v. Dixon, 615
N.Y.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (gender-neutral explanation must be reasonably definite; conclusory assertion of good faith generally considered inadequate).
110. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam).
111. Id. at 1771.
112. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. See State v. Gill, 460 S.E.2d 412, 415 (S.C. Ct. App.
1995) (a showing of pretext does not automatically result in a finding of discrimination; the determinative issue in any Batson/J.E.B. claim is whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a
party engaged in purposeful, invidious discrimination); Nelson v. U.S., 649 A.2d 301, 311 (D.C.
1994) (conclusory assertions without supporting references insufficient to support claim that facially
neutral reasons given by striking party were pretextual); People v. Allen, 616 N.Y.2d 672, 673 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994) (use of facially neutral reason to strike members of one gender but not similarly
situated members of other gender is strong indication that purported reason was not the true basis for
the strike).
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tion does become relevant. 113 The trial judge may "choose to disbelieve a
silly or superstitious reason,"" 4 and the appellate courts accord great
deference to this choice." 5 The burden to show pretext is difficult to
meet, 16 because purposeful discrimination is hard to prove."t '
The Court: Constitutionally Correct But Out of Touch With Reality
The Supreme Court in J.E.B. explicitly refused to engage in a balancing test between peremptories as an institution and the Court's battle to
ban all forms of discrimination from the courtroom. " 8 Instead, the Court
considered whether gender-based peremptory strikes provide substantial
aid to a trial attorney's "effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.""19 The
Court concluded they do not, based on its view that "gender plays no
identifiable role in jurors' attitudes. " " While the Court's holding is
correct as a constitutional matter, the majority's reasoning is largely
unrealistic, inconsistent, and prone to have a paralyzing effect on
peremptories.
The Court's focus on a trial attorney's effort to secure a fair and
impartial jury is unrealistic. A litigant strives for a favorably biasedjury,
rather than an unbiased one.' By taking the more sensible balancing

113. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.
114. Id. (emphasis in original).
115. See U.S. v. Johnson, where the Tenth Circuit Court held that whenever the prosecutor
offers an explanation for peremptory challenges which is accepted by the trial court, the court of
appeals reviews the trial court's ultimate factual ruling under the clearly erroneous standard. 941 F.2d
1102, 1108-1109 (loth Cir. 1991).
116. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. Since there will seldom be much evidence on that issue, the
best indication often will be the demeanor of the attorney exercising the challenge. Evaluation of a
striking party's state of mind lies "peculiarly within a trial court's province." Id.
117. The difficulty of establishing pretext is illustrated by the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. The Court held the striking party's reason must be "legitimate," which
merely means that the reason should not deny Equal Protection. Id. The offered reason does not have
to make sense. Id. The trial court believed the prosecutor when he declared he struck two black males
from the venire because one of them had long, unkempt hair and they both had goatee type beards
and mustaches that looked "suspicious" to the prosecutor. Id. at 1770. The Court upheld the trial
judge's judgment. Id. Justice Stevens' stinging dissent heavily criticized the majority for partly overruling Batson, for only requiring a facially neutral, but not a persuasive or plausible explanation at
the rebuttal stage. Id. at 1774. Although the majority opinion is difficult to parse, it should not be
read as overruling Batson in any way, for that would turn the Batson doctrine into a charade.
118. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at1425-26.
119. Id. at 1426.
120. Id. at 1426 n.9 (citations omitted). See also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
121. The Supreme Court has conceded that having a jury panel consisting of literally unbiased
people is impossible. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961). What is left is the assumption of
impartiality by having a jury with equally balanced biases, or, in other words, "diffused impartiality."
FRANKLIN D. STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 133 (1995).

According to Strier: "This is just an aspirational fiction ...
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approach," the Court could have made its reasoning more acceptable
while maintaining its adherence to the ideal of a fair and impartial jury
system. Instead, by merely stating that the only important government
interest that could be served by peremptories is securing a fair and impartial jury, the court made the unfortunate choice of basing its decision on
"one of the law's convenient but illusory chimeras.""
Moreover, the Court's stem attachment to the view that gender and
race do not influence jurors' attitudes denies the human nature of jurors.'24 Many trial attorneys strongly disagree with the Court's position."z
In Batson and its progeny, there has been an ongoing battle between the
majority and the dissents on the question whether gender and race do
matter to jury decisions. The majority says no, mainly because it does not
want to recognize challenges based on "the very stereotypes the law
condemns."" The dissenters say yes, and therefore want to allow an
unfettered use of peremptories.
In her concurrence to J.E.B., Justice O'Connor took the
middleground. She indicated that gender and race can lead to attitudinal
differences, contingent upon the circumstances. 27 Further, she noted the
who decides the case is just as important to the outcome as what is to be decided." Id. at 135-36. See
also ADLER, supra note 39, at 53 (1994); VALERIE P. HANS AND NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY
74 (1986); CLARENCE DARROW, VERDICTS OUT OF COURT 316 (1963).
122. This is the approach Justice O'Connor took in her concurrence. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. 143032. See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
123. STRIER, supra note 121, at 133.
124. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, may be correct that the majority approach puts the Court at
odds with Ballard, 329 U.S. at 194 (stating that either sex brings "a flavor, a distinct quality" to the
jury room), and Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532 n.12 (reasoning that women bring to juries their own values
and perspectives that influence both jury deliberation and result.). J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1436. However, as Justice Scalia indicated, the Court may have decided that changing times called for a unisexapproach, not so much, as Justice Scalia purports, because such an approach is "in fashion," but
rather to help the Court maintain its ideal of a fair and impartial jury system.
The J.E.B. Court shed some more light on this apparent inconsistency when it stated: "Even
if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-based
peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of gender." Id. at
1427 n.1 1. This seems to indicate the Court involved itself, at least in part, in the very balancing test
it purported to avoid. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
125. Many litigants, especially attorneys who conduct criminal trials, have their own favored
collection of stereotypes. Stephen Adler, writing about the Imelda Marcos trial, said the following
about Wyoming defense attorney Gerry Spence's preferences when he represented a criminal defendant: as to gender, Spence preferred men to women because "men had more experience with hellraising and were more forgiving of it." ADLER, supra note 39, at 55. As to race, Spence indicated the
Marcos defense team struck an Asian juror at least in part because of his Asian origin. Spence felt
that such a juror would believe in hierarchies and respect authorities like the federal prosecutors. Id.
at 57. As to religion, Spence declared he favored having Jews on his juries because he viewed them
as sensitive to persecution and suspicious of government power. Id. at 58.
126. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1426 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 410).
127. In this regard, Justice O'Connor rightfully remarked: "[Olne need not be a sexist to share
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litigants' interest in use of peremptories. " However, she also recognized
the Court's effort to ban discrimination from the courtroom.' 29 In balancing these interests, she concluded that the battle against discrimination
overrides the litigant's interest in an unfettered use of peremptories. 30 By
engaging in this balancing approach, Justice O'Connor's opinion offers a
more sensible explanation than the majority as to why the Court's holding
is constitutionally required.' 3 '

However, Justice O'Connor's opinion has its own shortcomings. She
did not offer alternatives or solutions to deal with the situation created by
the Court's position in J.E.B. Further, she dedicated a substantial part of
her opinion' to a repetition of her disagreement with Edmondson and
McCollum though these cases concern an analytically separate issue.' 33
In addition, the Court's approach in J.E.B. and its progeny seems
inconsistent. By banning race- and gender-based peremptories from the
courtroom while race and gender traditionally received different levels
of scrutiny, the Court in J.E.B. opened the door for an extension of
the Batson rationale to other suspect classes.' 34 These include religion,'35 national origin,' and mixes of suspect classes, such as race
the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his
or her view of the case." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432. See also Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving 'Its Wonderful Power', 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554 (1976).
128. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431.
129. Id. at 1432.
130. Id. at 1430.
131. A striking detail of the J.E.B. case is that J.E.B.'s counsel complained of gender discrimination by the state while he peremptorily struck ten females and the last remaining male. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text. Based on these facts, one could conceivably argue that J.E.B. 's counsel was estopped from bringing a Batson claim based on gender discrimination. In addition, one could
assert that when there is strong statistical evidence of discriminatory challenges on both sides, the
moving party must establish that as a result of the peremptory battle between the parties the sexual
composition of the jury differed significantly from that of the venire, to movant's prejudice. Nelson
v. U.S., 649 A.2d 301, 314 (D.C. 1994) (concurring opinion); cf. U.S. v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859
F.2d 1501, 1521-22 (6th Cir. 1988).
132. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432-33.
133. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
134. The Supreme Court, however, did seem to indicate that notwithstanding its broad approach, peremptory challenges based on group characteristics not specifically addressing suspect
classes, like occupation, are not covered by the Equal Protection Clause. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428
n.14.
135. See, e.g., Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868 at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec.
14, 1994); but see Thurman v. State, 887 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); cf State v.
Hlavaty, 871 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
A split of authority exists as to whether voir dire inquiry of a potential juror's religious
affiliation is proper if not relevant to the parties or issue in the particular case. See Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Elaine Carlson, supra note 25. at 973-75.
136. The famed defense attorney Clarence Darrow put forth strong viewpoints on national origin, religion, and gender in the context of the voir dire process:
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and gender. 3 ' Classification based on religion is subject to heightened
judicial review 3 ' and therefore would logically fit in the J.E.B. rationale.

39

However, shortly after J.E.B., the Supreme Court in Davis v.

Minnesota'" declined to grant certiorari to review a Minnesota Supreme Court decision which refused to extend Batson to the exercise
of religion-based peremptory strikes.' 4'
In Batson and J.E.B., the Court was apparently concerned with
banning discriminatory practices from the courtroom, and attempting
to make it more likely that juries will be fair and impartial rather than
favorably biased. While this concern might be laudable conceptually,
the Court in J.E.B. and its progeny has not acted consistently in pursuit of its ideals. Ultimately, the only way the Court could reach its
ideals would be to do away with peremptories.' 42 Imposing more limitations on peremptories destroys the character of peremptory challenges, 43 proliferates appeals,'" and leads attorneys and judges into the

[If an Irishman is called for examination, t]here is no reason for asking about his religion;
he is Irish; that is enough . . You would be guilty of malpractice if you got ridof him,
except for the strongest reasons . . .If a Presbyterian enters the jury box and carefully
rolls up his umbrella, and calmly and critically sits down, let him go. He is cold as the
grave . . Get rid of him with the fewest possible words before he contaminates the others. . . Luckily . . . my services were almost over when women invaded the jury box.

DARROW, supra note 121, at 317-320.
137. An example of such a mixed class, potentially forming a cognizable group, is AfricanAmerican men. In Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), the prosecution used five out of
nine peremptories to exclude African-Americans (three men and two women). Id. at *2. At the time
the defendant, an African-American male, brought his Batson motion, four African-American women
remained on the jury. Therefore, the defendant focused on the exclusion of black men from the jury
as the basis for his motion. Id. The Ninth Circuit declared the issue of whether African-American
men could constitute a Batson class "likely is worthy of consideration in light of recent holdings that
gender as well as race is an impermissible basis for peremptory challenges." Id. at *3.The court,
however, declined to address the issue, since any new rule on what constitutes a 'cognizable group'
could not be applied retroactively tothe case at hand. Id.
138. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
139. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
140. 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
141. Id. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented to the denial of certiorari as inconsistent with the Court's holding in J.E.B. Id. at 2120-22. In Davis, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove a black man from the venire. Id. at2120-21. The prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for the strike was that the struck juror was a Jehovah's Witness and that in his experience
Jehovah's Witnesses "are reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow human beings in this Court
House." Id. at 2121 (citing State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993)).
142. Justice Marshall already intimated this measure in his concurrence to Batson, 476 U.S. at
105-108. Of course, this complete abolition of peremptories might be hard to accomplish given that
peremptonries have been a part of American trial practice since its initiation, the strong lobby of trial
attorneys, and that the Court or legislator would take away an enormous business (jury-packing) from
jury consultants. See ADLER, supra note 39, at 223-24.
143. In Evans v. State, 653 P.2d 308 (Wyo. 1982), the Wyoming Supreme Court noted: "There
is a contradiction between assigning a reason of any kind to peremptory challenges when the very
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unclear waters of reasons, not having to rise to justifications for
cause. 145
Litigants beware!
J.E.B.'s General Effect on The Conduct of Voir Dire
According to the J.E.B. Court, a proper use of the voir dire process
can inform attorneys about jurors, give them viable reasons to strike that
juror, and make reliance on stereotypical notions unnecessary. t46 This
way, counsel can use their peremptory challenges intelligently. 47 Indeed,
trial attorneys should try to get a feel for Batson and J.E.B. issues that
could come up in the case at bar, or the sensitivity of the case to those
issues. Litigants should conduct voir dire aimed at eliciting sufficient information to be able at any time to give a race- or gender-neutral reason
to strike a juror they do not want on the petit jury. 8
A responsible use of voir dire has a twofold effect. In addition to the
possibility that it may reveal a basis for a challenge for cause, it may help
the party using the peremptory challenge to bring forward race- or gender-neutral reasons. On the other hand, voir dire may help the party
bringing the Batson/J.E.B. motion to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, or to show pretext. 49 The voir dire process may further
help an appellate court determine, on basis of the record, whether the trial
50
court's decision on the Batson/J.E.B. motion was clear error.1

definition of 'peremptory challenge' is the right to challenge a juror without assigning a reason for the
challenge." Id. at 310 n.2 (citations omitted).
144. See Annigoni, 57 F.3d at 744.
145. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
146. Id. at 1429.
147. Id.
148. In Matthew L. Larrabee and Linda P. Drucker, Adieu Voir Dire: The Jury Questionnaire,
21 No. 1 LMG. 37 (1994), the authors suggest the use of written questionnaires as a complement or
supplement of oral voir dire. Id. at 38. The use of such questionnaires might lead to limitation by
judge of oral voir dire time. Id. However, written questionnaires could lead to more frankness from
the jurors. Id. at 37. This would enable counsel to shift out biased jurors on cause and to conduct oral
voir dire much more efficiently. Id. at 38. A list of general questions which should be included in
such questionnaires is provided. Id. at 39-42.
149. The difficulty of proving pretext is illustrated in People v. Allen, 653 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y.
1995). In Allen, defendant claimed the gender-neutral reasons the prosecutor had for using 14 of her
15 peremptories to strike males were pretextual because these reasons were not applied equally to the
women from the jury who exhibited the same characteristics. Id. at 1175. The court concluded while
this circumstance could be identified as an inference of discrimination, it could also be an incomplete
understanding of the full reasons for the prosecutor's decision to seat some jurors while challenging
others. Id. at 1178. To determine this, the court needed a fuller factual inquiry by the trial court. Id
150. A clear example of the importance of a complete voir dire document on appeal is Acklin v.
State, 896 S.W.2d 423 (Ark. 1995) (court could not reach the merits of defendant's appeal to peremp-
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Litigants should conduct their questioning in an appropriate and
efficient manner. They should try to avoid unnecessary prolongation of
the voir dire process and procrastination of the actual trial. 5 , This sifting
process can discourage potential jurors from serving and can cause resentment in those who do."5 2 The litigant's possible success in ejecting a
biased juror has to be weighed against the possible setback of alienating
essentially fair-minded jurors."'
J.E.B.'s Effect on Voir Dire in Wyoming
Wyoming practitioners need to take notice of recent amendments of
the civil and criminal rules on voir dire.'54 New Wyoming Rule of Civil
Procedure (WRCP) 47 accords a much greater potential power to the trial
judge to assume control over the voir dire process.'55 WRCP 47(c) provides that litigants are entitled to conduct the examination of prospective
jurors, but this examination will take place under supervision and control
of the judge. The judge may conduct such further examination as she
deems proper. Indeed, she may assume the complete examination if she
determines that litigants fail to conduct the voir dire properly.' 56
WRCP 47 (c) also contains a 'checklist' of things that litigants are not
allowed to ask or do.' 7 The consequences of not following this strict rule

tory challenges "because of his failure to sufficiently abstract the record.') See also Pacee v. State,
816 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ark. 1991) (a record of voir dire is "that critical portion of the trial proceedings which would enable [the appellate court] to consider 'all relevant circumstances.'")
See also CATHY E. BENNE17 AND ROBERT B. HIRSCHHORN, BENNETT'S GUIDE TO JURY
SELECTION AND TRIAL DYNAMICS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION §17.14, at 331 (1993). If the

trial court does not grant the motion, the litigant must make sure to object before the jury is installed
and sworn in; preserve the record for appeal; make sure there is sufficient evidence in the record,
through preserved testimony or written materials such as jury questionnaires. Id.
If the judge rules on a motion alleging both race and gender discrimination, but fails to rule
on one of those allegations, this issue is lost on appeal if the attorney does not object to that failure.
See Hemphill, 1995 WL 490600, at *3.
151. See supra note 148, where it is pointed out that jury questionnaires can lead to a much
more efficient use of the oral voir dire process.
152. VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 163.
153. Id.
154.

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 47 was amended on November 30, 1992, and was effective Febru-

ary 25, 1993; WYO. R. CRIM. P. 24 was amended October 30, 1992, and was effective January
19, 1993.

155. The new WYO. R. CIV. P. 47(a)-(c) contain essentially the same language as old WYo. R.
CRIM. P. 24(a)-(c). New WYo. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)-(d) apparently were merely amended to modernize
the statutory language. Therefore, the amendment of this rule virtually had no effect on the potential
power of a judge in a criminal trial. The language in new WYO. R. CIV. P. 47(c) is identical to new
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
156. The judge's power to assume the complete examination was absent in old WYO. R. CIv. P. 47.
157. WYo. R. Civ. P. 47 (c) provides in pertinent part:
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may be serious. First, counsel might lose the ability to conduct voir dire
personally and elicit desired information from jurors. Moreover, counsel
might lose the chance to learn more about jurors and base their trial strategy
on that knowledge. Also, the opportunity to establish early favorable contact
with jurors might be lost. Finally, by not following the rule, counsel might
make an unfavorable impression upon at least some of the jurors.5'
If the judge at the initial stage of the voir dire process wants to
assume control, trial attorneys can argue they should personally conduct
the questioning. Counsel would have to make clear that there are potential
Batson or J.E.B. issues as to specific prospective jurors and that they
want to elicit more relevant information from these jurors in order to use
peremptories wisely.' 59 This argument should be easier to make now that
J.E.B. has extended the equal protection doctrine to gender.
The Future of Peremptory Challenges: Possible Responses
Several authors have suggested possible responses to the
Batson/J.E.B. line of cases. Stephen Adler"W proposed to limit the
number of peremptory challenges to reduce the impact of "the
'lawyers' ultimate poker game"16 1 and achieve a more random selection of jurors. As an alternative, he suggested banning peremptories
entirely from our jury system, either by the Court or by Congress. 62

47 (c)(2) The court shall not permit counsel to attempt to precondition prospective jurors to
a particular result, comment on the personal lives and families of the parties or their
attorneys, or question jurors concerning the pleadings, the law, the meaning of
words, or the comfort of jurors.
47 (c)(3) In voir dire examination, counsel shall not:
(A) Ask questions of an individual juror that can be asked of the panel or a group
of jurors collectively;
(B) Ask questions answered in a juror questionnaire except to explain an answer;
(C) Repeat a question asked and answered;
(D) Instruct the jury on the law or argue the case; or
(E) Ask a juror what the juror's verdict might be under any hypothetical circumstances.
Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) contains similar provisions.
158. A discussion of the pros and cons of having the judge or attorney conduct the voir dire is
beyond the scope of this casenote. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see STRIER, supra
note 121, at 134-36; VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 164-66.

159. The judge has a wide discretion when he decides whether to believe a striking party's
justification for its peremptory challenge, especially after the amendments to WRCP 47(c). In this
sense, the focus already shifted from attorneys to judges.
160. ADLER, supra note 39, at 220-224.
161. Id. at 221.
162. The English Parliament did so in 1988. Id. at 223. In England, potential jurors are picked

at random from voter lists. The lawyers are not permitted to ask the jurors questions or to begin
arguing the case before the jury is swom in. Id.
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Jeffrey Abramson 163 concluded that all peremptory challenges based on
a person's group identity should be ended under J.E.B., thus potentially leading to the effective demise of peremptories.164
According to Barbara Babcock, 65 eliminating peremptory challenges
from our system would be difficult to accomplish and ill-advised. This
measure would focus jury selection entirely on the challenge for cause
and allow the judge in practically unreviewable decisions to shape the jury
in every case.66 Instead, Babcock proposed the enactment of a comprehensive statute.' 67 This statute would broaden the jury pool beyond voter
registration lists, '6 supplement juror questionnaires to facilitate the voir
dire process. Further, it would let the parties give their opening statements to the whole venire and then
make inquiries afterward for both
69
cause and peremptory challenges. 1
CONCLUSION

Almost fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized
for the first time that women should be allowed on juries, because "a flavor" is lost if either sex is excluded. It is exactly this "flavor" that trial
attorneys want to add or subtract from a jury by using peremptories. This
process is primarily based on intuition and on inexplicable "hunches."
That is why a system of unfettered use of peremptories was enacted.
If Batson was correctly decided, the J.E.B. Court made the right move
constitutionally to extend the Batson rationale to gender. However, in the
process, the Court made the awkward assertion that gender does not have
any identifiable influence on jurors' attitudes. In addition, the Court compromised the supposedly peremptory character of certain challenges. Moreover,
it opened the door to a further limitation on the use of peremptories, without
establishing boundaries to this potentiality. The Court therefore has created a
potentially completely paralyzing effect on the peremptory strike.

163. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY

137 (1994).
164.
165.

Id.
Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U.

CIN. L. REv. 1139, 1175-79 (1993).
166.

Id. at 1175.

167. Id. at 1176.
168. The argument is often made that jury selection based solely on voter lists leads to
underrepresentation. ABRAMSON, supra note 162, at 125-27. Additional sources could include licensed drivers, utility users and people listed in the city directory. BABCOCK, supra note 164, at
1176.
169. Babcock, supra note 165, at 1177-78.
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The Court's decision could conceivably lead to a situation where
every peremptory strike would raise equal protection concerns. In order
for the peremptory strike to retain any significance, trial judges will have
to impose much higher standards to find a primafacie case of discrimination in the gender setting than they have done in the race context. However, the likelihood of inconsistent jurisprudence in the lower courts is
great because judges, attorneys, and clients are caught in the unclear
waters of reasons not having to rise to justifications for cause.
The adherence to the Batson/J.E.B. line of cases is undesirable,
because if followed consistently, it will in the end lead to unworkability
of peremptories"70 and destruction of their character. The Court needs to
make a clear choice. It should either take the unlikely road back to Swain
or it should abolish peremptories entirely.
BASTIAAN

K.

COEBERGH

170. Even the most crafty trial attorney will, at some point, only be able to deal with the
peremptories favorably toward his client through a large expenditure of time and money.
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